



POLAND

NATO Country Assessment — *TIER ONE* —

HIGHEST DEFENSE SPENDING • GROUND FORCES • EASTERN SHIELD




JULY 2026



TIER 1

Model Ally



AT A GLANCE

Toplines

- **NATO's Highest Defense Spender:** Spending at 4.48% of GDP on defense makes Poland NATO highest defense spender with the budget nearly tripling from ~\$16B in 2022 to ~\$46B in 2025.
- **Building the Largest Land Army in NATO Europe:** active personnel nearly tripled from ~100,000 (2014) to ~235,000 (2025), targeting 300,000 to fight a high-intensity war on Polish soil without waiting for allied reinforcement.
- **Anchors NATO's Entire Eastern Deterrence Architecture:** hosts the US Army's V Corps Forward Headquarters, ~10,000 US troops, Aegis Ashore BMD, and is building the \$2.5B, 700km East Shield border fortification system.



FORCE STRUCTURE AT A GLANCE



This radar chart compares a country's force structure to the Non-US NATO median (data from IISS's 2026 Military Balance) across six capability areas: Land Combat (tanks, IFVs), Active Personnel (total active-duty troops), Naval Combat (submarines, destroyers/frigates/corvettes), Air & Missile Defense (long/medium-range SAM systems), Air Combat (4th-gen+ combat aircraft), and Fires (artillery, rocket launchers). Scores are weighted, with modern platforms counted fully and legacy platforms counted at reduced weight.




MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Defense Spending Level

Poland's [defense spending](#) trajectory is unmatched in the alliance. Its budget nearly tripled between 2022 and 2025, reaching 4.48% of GDP—the highest in NATO, even ahead of the United States. In absolute terms, Poland's 2025 defense budget stands at approximately \$44 billion, up from around \$16 billion in 2022. Warsaw signed the Hague 5% pledge without hesitation and has consistently outpaced its own commitments. Poland was the only NATO member to already meet the new 3.5% threshold in 2024, a target the rest of the alliance is working toward for 2035.

Poland — Defense Spending as % of GDP, 2014-2025




MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Equipment Share

Poland devotes 54% of its defense budget to major equipment and related R&D—nearly triple NATO’s 20% guideline and the highest equipment share in the entire alliance. Personnel costs, at 26.7%, are disciplined and proportionate. This ratio reflects a deliberate strategic choice: Warsaw is not simply paying soldiers, it is buying combat power. By comparison, most Western European allies—Germany, France, Italy—cluster around or below the 20% equipment threshold, and several fell short even of that in recent years.

Poland — Defence Expenditure by Category, 2014-2025




MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Manpower & Recruitment

Poland's personnel cost share has fallen sharply (from ~52% in 2014 to ~27% by 2025) as the defense budget has grown faster than personnel costs, freeing an increasing share for equipment. Active personnel have risen dramatically, from ~100,000 in 2014 to ~235,000 by 2025, the steepest expansion of any NATO ally in absolute terms. Poland reintroduced voluntary basic military training and has aggressively expanded the Territorial Defence Force as a reserve and mobilization base alongside the regular army. The target is 300,000 active personnel—the largest land force in Europe outside Turkey and the largest in NATO's European eastern front—driven by an explicit strategic judgment that Poland must be able to fight a high-intensity land war on its own territory without waiting for allied reinforcement.

Poland — Personnel Cost Share & Active Personnel, 2014-2025



MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Capability Modernization

Poland's [modernization strategy](#) is organized around an ambitious strategic logic: building the most capable land-warfighting force in NATO Europe, with the mass, equipment, and fires depth to fight a high-intensity war on Polish territory without waiting for allied reinforcement. The armored fleet is approaching 900 MBTs across Abrams, Leopard 2, and K2 platforms—[exceeding 1,100 by 2030](#), more than Germany, France, the UK, and Italy combined. The air force is transitioning to an all-Western fleet anchored by 32 F-35As, making Poland the first Eastern European fifth-generation operator. HIMARS and JASSM-ER cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 900km provide deep-strike capability most European allies lack entirely. Patriot PAC-3 MSE addresses the air defense gap that Russia's missile campaign against Ukraine exposed. Poland has [allocated \\$662M](#) to domestic 155mm ammunition production targeting 150,000 rounds annually by 2028. Poland is undergoing a massive investment reflecting hard lessons from Ukraine that most European allies have not internalized.



MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Force Posture

Poland has become the hub of NATO's eastern deterrence architecture. It hosts approximately [10,000 US troops](#), the V Corps Forward Headquarters—the US Army's senior land command in Europe—a Combat Aviation Brigade, and the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense site at Redzikowo. Warsaw hosts NATO's [Enhanced Forward Presence](#) battlegroup and the [Multinational Corps Northeast headquarters](#), and has forward-deployed allied forces—German Patriot batteries, Dutch and Norwegian F-35s—on its territory precisely because it has made itself the credible anchor of the eastern front. Poland also contributes troops to NATO missions in Latvia, Romania, Kosovo, Lebanon, and Iraq simultaneously. In 2024, it launched construction of the [East Shield](#)—a \$2.5 billion, 700-km border fortification system along its borders with Russia and Belarus, targeted for completion in 2028.



MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Industrial Base

Poland's defense industrial base is undergoing rapid transformation, consolidating under the state-owned [Polish Armaments Group \(PGZ\)](#), which encompasses over 60 companies spanning ammunition, armored vehicles, missiles, and electronics. Three new ammunition facilities are under construction; a BAE Systems partnership will enable a 16-fold increase in 155mm production capacity, targeting 150,000 rounds annually. PGZ has contracted to deliver nearly 300,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition to the Polish armed forces by 2029. Poland also secured the largest single allocation from the [EU's SAFE defense loan program](#)—\$51 billion, nearly one-third of the \$176 billion fund—to finance continued modernization. South Korean technology transfer agreements attached to K2 tank and K239 Chunmoo contracts are building domestic production competency for future indigenous variants, reducing long-term import dependency.



STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT

Declared Posture

Poland's governing strategy document remains the [2020 National Security Strategy](#). On Russia, it aligns tightly with NATO 2022—naming “the neo-imperial policy of the Russian Federation” as the most serious threat. On China, it diverges by under-specification: China is mentioned only as a factor in great-power rivalry, with no characterization comparable to NATO's “systemic challenges” framing. On Iran, the document is largely silent—a notable divergence from NATO 2022's proliferation language.




STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT

Ukraine Support


Poland is a near top-tier [Ukraine donor](#). Bilateral commitments reached 0.52% of GDP in 2022—among the highest in the alliance—placing Poland in the leading cluster alongside the Nordics and Baltics. Poland was the second-largest bilateral supporter globally in early-war tallies, providing military equipment and platforms rather than financing. Poland transferred tanks, artillery, aircraft, ammunition, and air defense systems transferred at scale in the war's most critical early phase. Delivery performance has been strong—Eastern European donors including Poland delivered over 80% of [pledged heavy weapons](#), outperforming Western European allies on follow-through. Since 2024, Poland has shifted toward EU-routed financial support mechanisms, with bilateral figures declining as the early equipment surge completed, but the cumulative contribution to Ukrainian survival in 2022–2023 is among the most consequential of any ally.

Poland — Ukraine Aid, 2022–2025

Poland: Aid to Ukraine by Type



Poland: Aid to Ukraine as % of GDP



STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT

Russian Decoupling

Poland has executed a near complete Russian energy decoupling program—Russian [gas fell](#) from ~52% of imports in 2015 to zero by 2024, [coal](#) from ~60% to zero, and [oil](#) from ~90% to effectively zero, driven by Baltic Pipe completion and LNG terminal expansion. However, Poland has been slow to cut imports of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from Russia—with [recent action](#) rectifying early slowness. Overall energy import dependence rose as substitutes replaced Russian sources, but the structural dependence on Moscow is gone. On sanctions enforcement, Poland has built a strong legal architecture including the April [2022 Sanctions Act](#) and February 2025 [anti-circumvention amendments](#) with criminal penalties of 3–15 years, operating as a frontline enforcer alongside the Baltics. The structural bottleneck is corporate criminal liability requiring prior individual conviction before entities can be prosecuted—limiting prosecution counts and creating a gap that EU Directive 2024/1226 transposition is meant to close.



STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT

Public Support & Political Resilience

Poland recorded 91% for staying in NATO, second only to Albania, with 82% feeling more safe from NATO cooperation and 76% agreeing Poland should defend another ally, consistently near the top of the alliance across all survey years. Eighty-six percent said Russia's war had affected Poland's security, the highest figure in the entire survey, and Ukraine support stood at around 70% combined. Fifty-three percent favored increasing defense spending in 2024, substantially understating Poland's actual commitment of 4.7% of GDP in 2026. The Tusk coalition government maintains record defense spending and is among the most vocal advocates for Ukraine within NATO, while the opposition PiS was itself a strong NATO hawk in government and continues to support the alliance in opposition. The only notable dissent comes from Konfederacja, at roughly 10 to 12% of voters, which opposes military aid to Ukraine but remains outside government without leverage on core security decisions.



STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT

Hedging Behavior

Poland's hedging behavior is low: no Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or DPRK arms purchases; early action against Huawei in 5G (2020 framework legislation; formal phase-out via NIS2 transposition in 2024); no PM or Presidential visits to Moscow or Tehran since 2020; and while Poland is a BRI signatory, there have been no major new infrastructure deals and Chinese FDI stock totals only ~€2.5bn (2000–2024). The one outlier is Duda's June 2024 state visit to Beijing, where he endorsed a [2024–2027 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Action Plan](#) and publicly affirmed BRI cooperation. However, the Tusk government skipped the Third Belt and Road Forum in October 2023.



STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT

Operational Cooperation

Poland's operational record is among the strongest of any post-Cold War NATO member. Warsaw was one of just four nations to [join the initial invasion](#) of Iraq in 2003, subsequently led the [Multinational Division Central-South](#), deployed 33,000 [troops to Afghanistan](#) over the course of that mission, and lost 63 soldiers across both theaters. Polish forces were consistently more willing to engage in combat than most NATO allies. However, Poland issued only diplomatic condemnation of Houthi attacks and contributed no ships, aircraft, or personnel to Operation Aspides, leaving the naval burden to smaller allies like Belgium, Denmark, and the Baltic states. On the 2026 Iran conflict, Tusk's government explicitly ruled out sending forces to the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz, with Poland initially excluded from the 35-state Hormuz security coalition before [Sikorski joined](#) the diplomatic track at the last minute.

